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A concern that people ought to be given what they deserve, in both positive and negative 
senses, lies deep within the human psyche. Views on the level of reward or punishment that a 
person deserves for their actions will differ across persons, places and time, but, I argue in 
this article, depend substantively upon some combination of intentions and outcomes. Using 
these characteristics, I propose a taxonomy of actions, ordered from most to least 
blameworthy, with, for example, it being suggested that for any particular level of harm an 
intentional yet unrealised harm is more blameworthy than an unintentional yet realised harm 
(a similar taxonomy can be developed for the positive domain of praiseworthy actions). The 
taxonomy is focused upon people’s actions towards others, but I finish the article with a 
discussion of desert in relation to people’s intentions towards themselves. Ultimately, I 
contend that the strength and sustainability of public sector services and welfare systems, not 
to mention our private relationships, rely upon the recognition that desert underpins our 
notion of justice.   
 




Desert and Justice 
 
In his classic book Doing & Deserving, Feinberg posed the following question: ‘What is it to 
deserve something? This guileless question can hardly fail to trouble the reflective person 
who ponders it. Yet until its peculiar perplexities are resolved, a full understanding of the 
nature of justice is impossible, for surely the concepts of justice and desert are closely 
connected’ (Feinberg, 1970, p.55). Many earlier philosophers would not have disagreed. In 
the Nicomachean Ethics, for instance, Aristotle wrote that: ‘… awards should be “according 
to merit”; for all men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit in 
some sense’ (Aristotle, 1980, p.112), and in Utilitarianism, Mill contended that: ‘… it is 
universally considered just that each person should obtain that (whether good or evil) which 
he deserves; and unjust that he should obtain a good, or be made to undergo an evil, which he 
does not deserve.’ 
 
A concern for desert appears to have some deep psychological basis to it. That is to say, 
deliberations on what justice entails did not give rise to a concern for desert, but rather a 
sense of rewarding and punishing based on some conception of desert, which probably 
evolved naturally because of the group and individual benefits that it serves, necessarily 
informed discussions on justice. Indeed, some desert-driven behaviours may even transcend 
our own species. For example, de Waal (2010) placed two monkeys in a cage that separated 
them with a wire mesh. Both monkeys were required to pull on a counterweighted tray in 
order for only one of them to reach a cup of apple slices. It was reported that the monkey that 
could reach the apple slices would push more of it through the wire mesh to its assistant than 
when it had to secure the apple slices entirely via its own efforts, and if the assistant was not 
rewarded as such it was less likely to cooperate in a repeat task. One could interpret these 
rewards and punishments as being motivated by a basic – almost instinctive – sense of desert.  
 
With respect to our own species, the traditional view within the field of child development 
psychology is that children start to relate earnings to work contributions at about six years of 
age, but over the last decade evidence has emerged that children do this from as young as 
three years, suggesting that it is almost natural for us to be driven to some degree by notions 
of desert. For example, Kanngiesser and Warneken (2012) reported a study in which 36 three 
and five year-olds (18 of each) played a fishing game. Each child was paired with a puppet 
partner and both “fished” for coins, which could be later exchanged for stickers. Importantly, 
the relative number of coins collected by each partner in a pair could be manipulated by the 
experimenter by “speeding up” or “slowing down” the puppet. The children, on receiving 
their sticker rewards, were able to share some of them with their puppet partner. Kanngiesser 
and Warneken observed that the children, on average, kept significantly more stickers for 
themselves when they had collected more coins than the puppet than when they had collected 
fewer, although it ought to be noted that very few children gave the puppet more than half of 
the total number of stickers available, even when the latter had collected the most coins. 
Selfish behaviour was thus far from absent in this study, and the ability to reward according 
to merit to the extent that the final outcome is definitively disadvantageous to those in control 
of rewards probably does not develop until middle childhood, but the rudiments of a concern 
for desert-based rewards were evident.  
 
 




In most circumstances, reciprocal exchange is unlikely to be sustained in a manner that is 
healthy and beneficial to all involved parties unless there is, among those concerned, a 
perceived balance to the exchange, which is where desert often enters. For instance, if you 
were to give someone an espresso machine for his birthday and he later gifts you a wooden 
spoon for yours, then assuming that the other person is not substantially poorer than yourself, 
future birthday presents are either likely to return to approximate parity with respect to the 
value of the presents (i.e. you might buy him a fish slice next year), or the exchange will 
discontinue altogether. Or to give a more extreme example of negative reciprocity, in many 
contemporary societies people would generally be appalled if the punishment for stealing a 
loaf of bread were to have one’s hands cut off, because of a feeling that the perpetrator did 
not deserve that level of punishment for the crime committed – i.e. the crime and the 
punishment are unbalanced (or, equivalently, the punishment does not fit the crime).      
 
Although people seem to have some almost instinctive sense of desert, the extent to which 
people are perceived to be deserving of something is often an amorphous concept that may 
differ interpersonally, as well as across time and place, as the above stated example of having 
one’s hands removed for stealing food might indicate (stealing food is a more serious matter 
when food is generally scarce than when it is available in abundance). Even if we limit 
ourselves to the simplest form of reciprocity bar the instinctive attitudinal type that is 
common in the animal kingdom (e.g. cats licking each other) – i.e. direct positive dyadic 
reciprocity – desert can be a malleable, complex concept.  
 
For instance, do we prioritise our attention, and/or give most to, those who have given most 
to us in absolute terms, to those who have given the most relative to their own resources, to 
those who we know will be quick – or slow – to put a halt to their reciprocating behaviour if 
they feel they have been slighted, or, going beyond dyadic reciprocity, to those who give the 
most to others quite apart from ourselves? Deliberation on the extent to which people are 
deserving may encompass all of these considerations and more; all potentially help us to 
identify, engender and sustain the most mutually beneficial long-term reciprocal 
relationships. Give too much, and you risk breeding resentment (possibly in you and in the 
recipient) and/or enforced obligation rather than a free and fair exchange, which would not 
bode well for long-term, and perhaps even short-term, cooperation; give too little and the 
hope of a long-term reciprocal mutually beneficial relationship will likely be a non-starter.    
 
With respect to negative reciprocity, if the punishment is felt to exceed the crime or vice-
versa, there will be a prevailing sense that justice has not been served, which may lead to 
resentment, further retribution, spiralling retaliation, and/or a general unwillingness to engage 
freely in social cooperation. People may still cooperate under a cloud of fear, but fear is not 
conducive to mutually beneficial actions, and without mutual benefit the cooperation is 
unlikely to be sustained. In short, negative reciprocity, which serves to bind groups together 
by deterring those who might otherwise transgress social norms, will threaten to tear groups 
apart if desert as a concept is not embraced, explained and widely accepted in the shape of 
policies, institutions and interventions. Public or popular opinion might of course often 
clamour for greater punishment for a misdemeanour than a deeper reflection on justice (or 
even common sense) will warrant. Given the complexity and malleability of desert, and the 
need for criminal justice systems to consider punishment, penitence, reformation, deterrence 
and the like, it is likely that the scales of justice will often be considered by many to be 
somewhat unbalanced. To sustain a justice system, or group cohesion, or even personal 
relationships, it is important to explain clearly the rationale for why a particular punishment 
is deserved, and then hopefully, over time, a compromise might be reached if there is initial 
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disagreement pertaining to this explanation. Both sides to the exchange have to be satisfied 
that the punishment fits the crime – that desert is given its proper due. 
 
 
A Taxonomy of Blame 
 
When considering desert in relation to punishment (and, indeed in relation to reward, but for 
ease of exposition I will focus on negative reciprocity here), it is important to recognise that 
people often act not entirely through volition but due to the force of necessity. For instance, 
when people face extreme scarcity and are in great need, they may face little choice in acting 
egoistically if they are to survive. Consequently, our response to a person who steals a loaf of 
bread, for example, is likely to differ if that person is starving than if he has ample food 
supplies (and, indeed, will differ if we are starving than if we have ample food supplies). 
Thus, we ought to distinguish between actions over which a perpetrator is morally 
responsible and can therefore be blamed fully, and actions over which it is harder to attach 
blame. As Feinberg (1970, p.117) notes: ‘… general rules must list all crimes in the order of 
their moral gravity, all punishments in the order of their severity, and the matchings between 
the two scales. But the moral gravity scale would have to list as well motives and purposes, 
not simply types of overt acts, for a given crime can be committed in any kind of “mental 
state,” and its “moral gravity” in a given case surely must depend in part on its accompanying 
motive.’ 
 
In order to judge the blameworthiness of an action, one ought to distinguish between actions 
that are causal and actions that are attributive. That is, in order to fully assign blame for an 
unwanted outcome, it is insufficient to proclaim that an action caused a harm; one also must 
attribute an objectionable aspect of the action directly to the harm that has occurred. Feinberg 
(1970, pp.196-197) relates attributive actions to what he calls the triconditional analysis, 
consisting of: i) the fault condition; ii) the causal condition – i.e. that the act was a cause of 
the harm; and iii) the causal relevance condition – that the faulty aspect of the act was its 
causal link to the harm. According to Feinberg, the causal relevance condition goes a long 
way towards discerning whether someone’s action is fully blameworthy (or praiseworthy, if 
we are in the domain of positive actions). 
 
Feinberg (1970, pp.207-208) illustrates his argument with the following lively scenario: 
‘Consider … the case of the calamitous soup-spilling at Lady Mary’s dinner party. Sir John 
Stuffgut so liked his first and second bowls of soup that he demanded a third just as Lady 
Mary was prepared to announce with pride to the hungry and restless guests the arrival of the 
next course. Sir John’s tone was so gruff and peremptory that Lady Mary quite lost her 
composure. She lifted the heavy tureen with shaking arms and, in attempting to pass it to her 
intemperate guest, spilled it unceremoniously in the lap of the Reverend Mr. Straightlace.’ In 
this example, one might contend that the causal relevance condition suggests that Sir John’s 
gruffness unsettled Lady Mary, which consequently caused the accident. Sir John is thus to 
some extent to blame for soiling the reverend’s trousers. If Sir John had instead politely 
requested more soup, although we might still judge him at fault for his gluttony, the absence 
of any gruffness to his tone might mean that we would be less inclined to blame him for the 
soup spillage. As Feinberg (1970, p. 222) notes: ‘… if the harmful outcome was truly “his 
fault,” the requisite causal connection must have been directly between the faulty aspect of 




However, although Sir John’s gruffness may have caused the soup to spill, he did not intend 
for that outcome to occur. Intending the bad outcome to occur is thus not a prerequisite for 
some deserved degree of blame, but intending as such may scale up the blame that the 
perpetrator merits. The notion of intention thus allows us to construct a taxonomy, 
summarised in Table 1, of the degree to which blame is merited for an action that often – but 
not always – leads to a harmful outcome. 
 
 
Table 1:  
A Taxonomy of Blameworthy Actions* 
Action type A: An action intended to cause harm and causes that harm. 
Action type B: An action intended to cause harm and does not cause that harm.  
Action type C: An action unintended to cause harm and causes that harm. 
   Action type C1: The action is objectionable. 
   Action type C2: The action is unobjectionable. 
Action type D: An action unintended to cause harm and does not cause that harm.  
   Action type D1: The action is objectionable. 
   Action type D2: The action is unobjectionable. 
*For actions of the same level of seriousness 
 
 
In Table 1, Action type A, where a person intends to cause harm and the harm occurs, is the 
most blameworthy. This would be the case, for example, if Sir John, displeased with Lady 
Mary’s reaction to his request and with the Reverend Mr. Straightlace’s sanctity, had 
deliberately pushed the tureen from her hands and into the latter’s lap. Action type B occurs 
when there is a similar intention to harm, but for whatever reason, the intended harm does not 
occur. For instance, Sir John attempts to deliberately push the tureen in the direction of the 
Reverend Mr. Straightlace, but stumbles, falls back into his chair and no soup is spilled. Sir 
John’s intentions are still blameworthy, but since no damage occurred, Action type B is not 
as blameworthy as Action type A.  
 
Action type C – unintended harm-causing actions – can be broken down into two subtypes, 
C1 and C2, the first of which is reflected in Feinberg’s (1970) original Sir John scenario 
summarised earlier. Sir John did not intend to spill the soup, but in the original scenario his 
rude demeanour flustered Lady Mary, which may have contributed to her dropping the 
tureen. His gruff behaviour was objectionable – Action type C1 – and he is thus blameworthy 
to a degree. If he had politely asked for more soup, we have an example of Action type C2: 
his demeanour is unobjectionable and he did not intend for the soup to be spilled, but his 
requesting (possibly too much) soup did contribute to the tureen being dropped, and thus he is 
perhaps still somewhat blameworthy, but not as blameworthy as in Action type C1. In this 
respect, incompetence might also fall under the objectionable label, which may be a reason 
why politicians in several countries were viewed as considerably blameworthy for the 
consequences of the coronavirus pandemic, even though they did not intend what many have 
perceived as avoidable harms to occur (alternatively, an unintended harm that is the 
consequence of a person acting upon a basic need may warrant an unobjectionable label). In 
Action type C2 compared to Action type C1, the causal relevance condition has been 
weakened. Whether Action type B is more blameworthy than Action type C or vice-versa 
depends upon the trade-off between intentions and outcomes (i.e. B has worse intentions and 
C has worse outcomes). On a population level, this is likely to be an empirical question, but 
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for me, in terms of assigning blame, an intention to harm (even if the harm is not realised) is 
worse than an unintentional realised harm.  
 
Finally, Action type D, where there is no intention to cause a harm that is not in any case 
realised, is of course not blameworthy at all, but this too can be broken down into two 
subtypes, D1 and D2, where in the former the person’s behaviour is otherwise objectionable 
and in the latter it is not. In terms of Sir John and the tureen, D1 and D2 are identical to C1 and 
C2 with the important exception that the soup is not in fact spilled. The only reason for 
differentiating between D1 and D2 here is not to apportion blame, but to recognise that those 
that commit Action type D1 (compared to D2), in committing more strongly Feinberg’s 
(1970) fault condition, are placed at greater risk of satisfying the triconditional analysis if a 
relevant harm was to occur in the future. One also might want to avoid inviting such people 
to dinner parties (or, indeed, to choose to cooperate with them in other situations). 
 
This attempt at identifying different levels of deserved blame informs the debate on what 
might be the correct application of negative reciprocity, and extends, in its mirror-image, to 
the identification of deserved credit in informing positive reciprocity. For instance, an 
intention to benefit someone that is realised as an outcome would surely deserve some 
consideration of a return in kind. In the positive domain, Action type C1 might be that the 
action is welcome, and Action type C2 that the action is neutral. For example, if Sir John was 
so agreeable towards Lady Mary at the dinner table that he relaxed her to such an extent that 
she later beat everyone at billiards, Sir John might deserve some credit for her victory. If the 
same were to occur except that she was not undefeated at billiards, we would have the 
positive mirror image of Action type D1: Sir John would deserve no credit for the billiard 
victory because the victory did not happen, but his agreeable nature over dinner might still 
serve as a signal that he is a person with whom one might wish to cooperate/reciprocate in the 
future.  
 
Although it might not always be easy to discern intentions nor link intentions directly to 
outcomes, this discussion is thus relevant when considering what might be a proportionate 
response to others’ actions in both the private sphere of people’s lives and in informing the 
design of public policy. Overall, it is clear that when it comes to considering the notion of 
desert – i.e. when it comes to deciding with whom to reciprocate and by how much – a 
person’s intentions towards others and the outcomes experienced by those others both matter. 
Moreover, when considering desert, a person’s intentions towards themselves may matter too.  
 
 
The Deserving Poor 
 
Rawls (1999) argued that if each of us was unaware of our position in the world – i.e. if we 
were placed behind his so-called veil of ignorance – then out of self-interest we would choose 
to focus our attention on improving the situation of those who are the worst off, in part 
because for all we know, we could be among them. The argument is that a proper 
consideration of justice would preclude the consideration of our own positions, tastes, and 
life experiences (etc.) when making a judgment about how society ought to be organised; that 
the scenario focusses our minds on how we would wish to be treated by others if we were in 
unfortunate circumstances, and leads us to treat others in that same way. Thus, justice, in this 




However, the world that we live in is of course unaligned with Rawls’s transcendental 
proposition. The success and sustainability of policy interventions and institutions depend 
upon how people react to them in reality. For that, we must consider people’s perceptions of 
how to organise society when their own (and, to a degree, others’) positions, tastes, efforts, 
characters and life experiences (etc.) are known to them – i.e. when the veil of ignorance is 
lifted. It is of course possible – even likely – that many would still opt for a maximin policy 
direction (or at least for a direction that helps the worst off to some extent), and for a host of 
reasons, including the reputational benefits that may be garnered from signalling as such and 
even pure altruism. However, many others might demand an indication that those at the 
bottom deserve any assistance that is directed towards them.   
 
As noted by Feinberg (1970), rewards and punishment may be given in response to gratitude 
and resentment, and many might feel gratitude towards those who benefit from public 
programmes if they offered something tangible in return, assuming, of course, that they are 
able, which could in turn better ensure the continued support and sustainability of those 
programmes. This takes us back into the realm of the desert-based arguments discussed 
earlier (i.e. desert in relation to the intentions and outcomes directed at others). For example, 
a structure could be put in place for people in receipt of welfare to volunteer to undertake 
some hours of public works each week if they are physically and mentally able, and the total 
number of voluntary hours committed could be widely disseminated on a weekly or monthly 
basis. As a form of conditional cash transfer, people in receipt of welfare could alternatively 
be required to undertake such work for them to continue to receive support, which may still 
serve as an indicator of desert, even though a non-voluntary requirement might breed 
resentment. Although the notion of expecting, or even requiring, able-bodied people in 
receipt of welfare to offer something tangible back to society while they are in receipt of 
publicly-financed benefits will be unpalatable to some, a refusal to work if one is able in such 
circumstances is arguably a form of free riding – or egoism – that can damage the groups of 
which we are all a part.  
 
However, Feinberg (1970) also contends that rewards/benefits and punishments/penalties 
may be given in recognition that someone has done something good or bad, without any 
consideration of gratitude or resentment attached. Here, there is no link between gratitude and 
desert. Feinberg (1970, p.70) states, for instance, that: ‘When the father paid his son a 
quarter, he acknowledged his son’s achievement without necessarily feeling any joy, 
gratitude, or any other emotion.’ This argument can be extended to more profound domains 
where people have done “good” (or not done “bad”) to themselves. For instance, if it is 
perceived that an individual is personally responsible for his misfortune, then many might 
take the view that he is less deserving of assistance than if his misfortune is beyond his 
control. This type of scenario is sometimes discussed in relation to the prioritisation of public 
health care resources; i.e. if someone suffers ill health, can we make a case that he ought to 
be a greater priority if his misfortune is the result of genetics or accident than if it is the 
consequence of his own personal lifestyle choices (e.g. see Le Grand, 1991)?  
 
Of course, it is unlikely that many of those who adjudge people to be undeserving according 
to the above criteria would withhold assistance entirely (not least because they recognise that 
recipients of assistance might feel entitled to public sector services that they have contributed 
to financially, and also identifying exactly what has caused a person’s misfortune may often 
be impossible), but if one does not account for personal responsibility then the emphasis may 
shift somewhat from desert to charity, from reciprocity to pure altruism. Feinberg (1970, 
p.75-76) makes the same point when he writes: ‘When a person suffers a loss, it may be the 
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fault of another person or it may be no one’s fault … the nature of desert differs in the two 
cases. There is, however, a third possibility: the loss or injury may be his own fault. In that 
case, though he may well be entitled to help, we should be loath to say that he deserved it; for 
we do not as a rule compensate people for their folly or indolence, and even when we do, it is 
not because we think they deserve it. Herein lies the difference between helping a person out 
of a jam simply through charitable beneficence and giving him aid he deserves … There is 
nothing pitiable about a person who deserves help.’ 
 
Feinberg thus suggests that there is something pitiable about a person who is helped through 
charity. If welfare and other forms of publicly-provided benefits are generally perceived as 
charity – as pity-driven acts of pure altruism – rather than as being deserved, this may have 
implications with respect to the size and sustainability of the assistance given. Feinberg 
(1970, p.87) contended that: ‘… desert is a moral concept in the sense that it is logically prior 
to and independent of public institutions and their rules, not in the sense that it is an 
instrument of an ethereal “moral” counterpart of our public institutions’, and earlier in this 
article I presented evidence that suggests that people, probably from a very young age, are 
indeed driven by notions of desert. If one wants to secure the best chance that substantive 
welfare programmes will exist into the future, it is a matter of sensible strategy to design 
them so that it is clear that the people whom they benefit are, as far as is possible, seen as 





I have addressed three notions of desert in this article, two of which are associated with 
people’s intentions and outcomes towards others and the other of which is associated with 
people’s intentions towards themselves. Specifically, they are that people: (i) deserve 
something positive for intending/producing something good for others; (ii) deserve something 
negative for intending/producing something bad for others; and (iii) deserve something 
positive for intending to prevent something bad for themselves. I contend that desert, and the 
associated concept of reciprocity, are stronger human motivational forces than pure altruism, 
and that the strength and sustainability of public sector services and welfare systems (not to 
mention our private relationships and collaborations) may depend upon a broad acceptance of 
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